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affirmative defense may lead some courts to conclude the burden of proof
is on the defendant to show involuntary intoxication by a preponderance
of the evidence.97 Such a conclusion is not warranted by the Torres decision and should not be reached if involuntary intoxication is to be a viable defense in Texas. The differences between insanity and involuntary
intoxication are sufficient to justify treating them differently as defenses.
The court of criminal appeals in Torres neither places the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the defendant" nor requires
a finding of insanity under section 8.01(a) of the Penal Code.9 Involuntary intoxication is a defensive issue, and the defendant need only raise
affirmatively the two aspects of the defense, involuntariness and mental
dysfunction. 100 The burden of proof remains on the state to overcome this
defensive issue beyond a reasonable doubt.101 If the Texas courts choose
to follow a literal interpretation of Torres, involuntary intoxication is unlikely to be frequently pled and even less likely to be successful. If, however, the Torres decision is recognized as being independent of the Penal
Code and the insanity defense, involuntary intoxication will be accepted
as a valid defense to criminal responsibility in Texas.
Lewis Buttles
JUDGMENTS-Tolling Limitations-Reasonable Diligence By a
Judgment Creditor to Discover a Debtor's Fraudulent
Concealment of Assets Avoids Limitations Governing
Issuance of Executions and Revival of Judgments
Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts,
591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
L. W. Stonecipher recovered a money judgment against Thomas Butts
and his wife Irene in 1950.1 Executions issued thereon in May of that year
97. Id. at 740-50.
98. Id. at 749-50. The court fails to discuss burden of proof at all. Since defensive issues
generally need only be affirmatively raised by the defendant, the same requirement should
apply to involuntary intoxication, absent express language to the contrary. See Wilson v.
State, 581 S.W.2d 661, 670-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (on State's motion for rehearing)
(Clinton, J., dissenting).
99. See Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
100. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 581 S.W.2d 661, 670-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Day v.
State, 532 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Gavia v. State, 488 S.W.2d 420, 421
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
101. Wilson v. State, 581 S.W.2d 661, 670-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
1. In the original suit the Yellow Cab Company, a partnership wholly owned by the
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were returned nulla bona.' Discovery proceedings revealed the Butts had
no assets subject to execution,' and in 1961 the judgment- became dormant. Stonecipher initiated the present action in 1971 against the Butts
and Elmer Newman, a banker accused of collaborating in a scheme to
prevent collection of the prior judgment lien.4 Stonecipher asserted the
statutory limitations period had been tolled due to the defendant's fraudulent acts.' The trial court rendered judgment for the Butts. The Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, reasoning the judgment was dormant and no longer capable of being revived by statute or otherwise,
leaving Stonecipher with no recoverable damage.7 An application for writ
of error was granted by the Texas Supreme Court. Held-Reversed and
remanded. Reasonable diligence by a judgment creditor to discover a
debtor's fraudulent concealment of assets avoids limitations governing issuance of executions and revival of judgments.8
Generally a judgment lien serves to encumber the realty' of a judgment

Butts, was joined as a party defendant. See Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 579
S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
2. A return of nulla bona signifies a diligent search revealed no property that could be
levied upon in satisfaction of a levy of execution. See Reed v. Lowe, 63 S.W. 687, 689 (Mo.
1901); Langford v. Few, 47 S.W. 927, 930 (Mo. 1898).
3. Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 579 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. Civ. App. -Beaumont), rev'd, 591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979). A partial payment of $5,000 was paid on the
judgment which was rendered for $21,8080.36, plus interest. Id. at 28.
4. See id. at 28. The plaintiff alleged Thomas and Irene Butts transferred property they
owned into Newman's name for the express purpose of avoiding a levy on that property in
satisfaction of the original debt. See id. at 28.
5. See id. at 29. According to the applicable statutes, Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
3773 (Vernon 1966) and 5532 (Vernon 1958), the judgment was dormant and unable to be
revived. Therefore, the complainant pled not for revival of the judgment, but for fraud and
deceit. In the alternative, he claimed statutory limitations were tolled due to the defendant's fraudulent acts. Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
6. See id. at 807. The judgment for Butts was rendered by order of the court notwithstanding the jury's original verdict in favor of Stonecipher. Id. at 807.
7. See id. at 807.
8. Id. at 810.
9. Personal property of the debtor is not affected by the lien. See Fore v. United States,
339 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 912 (1976); Donley v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 328 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The term "real estate" includes a freehold interest either in fee simple, for life, or for a term
of more than one year. See, e.g., Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 571, 335 S.W.2d 584, 588 (1960);
Stroble v. Tearl, 148 Tex. 146, 150, 221 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1949); Robertson v. Scott, 141 Tex.
374, 375, 172 S.W.2d 478, 479 (1943). Mineral royalty interests are treated as real property;
however, a lien will not attach to rents and profits received from the minerals. See United
States v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 254 F. Supp. 114, 118 (W.D. La. 1965); Onyx Ref.
Co. v. Evans Prod. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Munzesheimer v. Leopold,
163 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). Vendor's lien
notes, Sugg v. Mozoch, 293 S.W. 907, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1927, writ ref'd), and
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debtor for the benefit of the party holding the judgment. 10 The holder, or
judgment creditor, is accorded the right to levy on the property in satisfaction of his judgment." A lien subsequently acquired by another party
is usually subordinate to the original creditor's recorded claim.1 ' In Texas
articles 5447 through 5451 of the Revised Civil Statutes specify the procedures that are mandatory for creation of this lien.' The bare announcement of a judgment alone will not create a lien, but rather the filing requisites enumerated in article 544914 must be satisfied. 15 Once a final
judgment for the payment of money is rendered, the abstract of judgment
is filed with and recorded by the county clerk of any county in which the
creditor desires to establish a lien." Upon proper recordation and indexing of the judgment, all non-exempt realty1 7 owned by the debtor in that

mechanic's lien notes, South Tex. Lumber Co. v. Nicoletti, 54 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1932, writ dism'd), are excluded from attachment.
10. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5449 (Vernon 1958). See generally Hudspeth,
Judgment Liens and Abstracts of Judgment in Texas, 32 TEx. B.J. 520, 520-21 (1969).
11. See TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5449 (Vernon 1958).
12. See United States v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 380 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1964);
North E. Independent School Dist. v. Aldridge, 528 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). An unrecorded interest, however, of which creditor
had knowledge when he acquired his lien takes precedence. See, e.g., Eagle Lumber Co. v.
Trainham, 365 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Steele
v. Harris, 2 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928, no writ); David v. State Bank, 238
S.W. 979, 983-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no writ).
13. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5447 (Vernon Supp. 1980), art. 5449 (Vernon
1958), art. 5449(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980), art 5450 (Vernon 1958), & art. 5451 (Vernon 1958).
14. Id. art. 5449 (Vernon 1958).
15. See Donley v. Youngstown Sheet v. Tube Co., 328 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); R. B. Spencer & Co. v. Green, 203 S.W.2d 957, 960
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, no writ); 29 TEXAs L. REV. 530, 534-35 (1951); cf. Fore v.
United States, 339 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 912 (1965) (money
judgment, not secured by lien, merely evidences a debt and has no priority among
claimants).
16. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5449 (Vernon 1958) & art. 5449(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1980). The abstract may be filed in all counties where the debtor presently owns or
may in the future acquire real property. See Student Symposium-Creditor's Post-Judgment Remedies in Texas, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 715, 768 (1974).
17. Real property that is exempt, or beyond the purview of the lien, consists primarily
of the debtor's homestead. Banks v. Gumm, 360 S.W.2d 836, 836-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1962, writ refd n.r.e.); Reisberg v. Hubbard, 326 S.W.2d 605, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1959, no writ); see TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. The exemption does not apply, however, to
any excess of residence homestead beyond constitutional provisions. See Harrison v. First
Nat'l Bank, 224 S.W. 269, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), afr'd, 238 S.W. 209 (1920).
Also exempt is a wife's separate property when the lien derives from a judgment against her
husband for his separate liabilities. See Bice v. Campbell, 231 F. Supp. 948, 951 (N.D. Tex.
1964); Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934, judgmt adopted).
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county, including any after-acquired property,18 becomes subject to the
resultant security interest. In addition, recording serves as constructive
notice to potential purchasers that the property is encumbered by a prior
judgment lien."9
The lienholder is afforded several alternatives for achieving foreclosure.
It is primarily accomplished by execution sale20 or by a bill in equity to
foreclose the lien.2 ' In the absence of a void judgment, 2' the validity of
the judgment lien may not be questioned by an adverse party during foreclosure.2" When the debtor has conveyed property after the lien has attached, that realty is subject to divestiture in the creditor's favor2 4 provided any remaining property of the debtor is levied upon first.2
The duration of a judgment has been statutorily established to span
ten years from the date of rendition.2 6 A writ of execution"7 may issue at

18. See Cheswick v. Weaver, 280 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). Any real property not exempt from a forced sale and acquired by the
debtor subsequent to establishment of the lien is subject to attachment. The coverage extends to property obtained by purchase, devise, or inheritance. See Frankie v. Lone Star
Brewing Co., 42 S.W. 861, 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892, writ ref'd).
19. See Baker v. West, 120 Tex. 113, 119-20, 36 S.W.2d 695, 697-98 (1931); 15 BAYLOR
L. REV. 248, 253 (1963).
20. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 621. Property that has been attached by a judgment lien and
levied on by the sheriff may be sold under authority of a writ of execution. See Swafford v.
Holman, 446 S.W.2d 75, 79-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Proceeds of
the sale inure to the benefit of the creditor according to the dollar value of his judgment as
established by the court. See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3824 (Vernon 1966).
21. A bill in equity is not an independent lawsuit to enforce the judgment lien, but a
petition by the creditor containing a statement of facts and requesting foreclosure by the
court. See Baker v. West, 120 Tex. 113, 119, 36 S.W.2d 695, 697 (1931). Although Texas
recognizes both the execution sale and bill of foreclosure, some states only authorize the sale
by execution. See Fikes v. Buckholts State Bank, 273 S.W. 957, 961 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1925, writ dism'd).
22. To support a lien a judgment must be valid. See Trigg v. Royal Indem. Co., 468
S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ) (execution may be issued only on a
final judgment); 29 TEXAS L. REv. 530, 534 (1951).
23. See Klier v. Richter, 119 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938, writ
ref'd); cf City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1973, no writ) (void judgment is of no effect).
24. See Snow v. Harding, 180 S.W.2d 965, 968 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, writ
ref'd w.o.m.). A judgment lien does not create a property right pre se, rather it bestows a
right to foreclosure which, when accomplished, relates back to the exclusion of interests
arising after the lien was established. Onyx Ref. Co. v. Evans Prod. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 253,
256 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
25. See Semple v. Eubanks, 35 S.W. 509, 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd); cf. Nichols v. Canslor, 140 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940, writ dism'd judgmt
cor.) (property fraudulently conveyed by debtor must be sold for benefit of creditor first).
26. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (Vernon 1966) which provides:
If no executon is issued within ten years after the rendition of a judgment in any
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any time during this period resulting in an additional ten year extension
from the date the execution was issued by the court.2 This provision enables a judgment creditor to maintain the force of his judgment indefinitely so long as the lapse of ten years does not render the judgment dormant.2 The lien, itself, is extended by filing new abstracts within the ten

year period.30 Should the judgment ever become barred, however, the lien

will be immediately expunged. 1 Hence, a lien may be extended for successive ten year periods by issuing execution on the judgment and filing
consecutive abstracts within ten year increments. 82
Article 553288 provides two additional remedies for maintaining the
force and validity of a judgment and the accompanying lien.8' The creditor may initiate a scire facias proceeding 8 or bring an action on the original debt.8 The primary purpose of article 5532, however, is to specify a

court of record, the judgment shall become dormant and no execution shall issue
thereon unless such judgment be revived. If the first execution has issued within the
ten years, the judgment shall not become dormant, unless ten years shall have
elasped between the issuance of executions thereon, and execution may issue at any
time within ten years after the issuance of the preceding execution.
Id.
27. Execution is a process employed to enforce a judgment. Upon the creditor's motion,
execution issues from a court directing a sheriff's sale of any real property owned by the
debtor and subject to a valid judgment lien. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 621 & 622.
28. Id. See generally 15 BAYoR L. REV. 248, 252-53 (1963).
29. See General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 93, 138 S.W.2d 531, 536 (1940);
Benson v. Greenville Nat'l Exchange Bank, 253 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5449 (Vernon 1958).
31. See id. The force of the lien is directly contingent on the validity of the judgment.
See id. See generally 29 TEXAS L. REV. 530, 534 (1951).
32. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (Vernon 1966); 29 TEXAs L. REv. 530, 536
(1951). See generally Student Symposium-Creditor's Post-Judgment Remedies in Texas,
5 ST. MARY's L.J. 715, 767. (1974).
33. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958) provides: "A judgment in any
court of record, where execution has not issued within twelve months after the rendition of
the judgment, may be revived by scire facias or: an action of debt brought thereon within
ten years after date of such judgment, and not after." Id.
34. Id; see Zummo v. Cotham, 137 Tex. 517, 518, 155 S.W.2d 600, 601 (1941); Estate of
Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 579 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), rev'd,
591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
35. Scire facias is a process used to revive a judgment after the twelve month period
stated in article 5532 has elapsed. Berly v. Sias, 152 Tex. 176, 181, 255 S.W.2d 505, 508
(1953). The procedure is provided since a judgment upon which no execution has been issued for twelve months is viewed as dormant. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5532
(Vernon 1958).
36. In much the same manner as a scire facias proceeding, an action on the original
debt may be brought by the creditor to revive a dormant judgment within ten years of the
date of judgment. Id.
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limitations period after which the judgment is barred. 7 The article provides for revival of judgments asserting that dormancy ensues when execution has not issued within twelve months after rendition." The language in article 5532 referring to dormancy is inconsistent with article
3773, the latter stipulating a judgment becomes dormant only when execution has not issued within ten years.8" The discrepancy arises because
article 3773 was amended in 1933 to include the ten year period, but article 5532 was not accorded a comparable revision.'0 In Cox v. Nelson, 1 the
Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals resolved this conflict by holding a judgment is effective for ten years during which time it may be extended for
an additional ten years by reissuing execution, using the scire facias proceeding, or instituting an action on the debt.'2
Statutes of limitation were first enacted by the English Parliament to
correct "abuses from stale demands.' 8 Their purpose today remains essentially the same, to stimulate parties toward diligent filing of claims
thereby assuring the most accurate presentation of facts possible" and
aiding in administration of justice by reducing the quantity of vexatious
litigation.' 5 Additionally, state legislatures are afforded the opportunity of
statutorily defining the time limits within which an action must be

37. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ); Stanton v. Brown, 269 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, no writ). See
generally 29 TEXAS L. REV. 530, 536 (1951).
38. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958). See generally Olds, Judgment
Liens in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REV. 664 (1968).
39. Compare TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958) (implies' that a judgment becomes dormant after twelve months, absent execution) with id. art. 3773 (expressly
states dormancy ensues only after ten years, also absent execution). See generally 31 TExAs
L. REV. 73, 74 (1952).
40. Compare 1933 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 144, § 1, at 369-70 (codified as TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (Vernon 1966)) (limitation extended to ten years) with Tx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958) (limitation remains twelve months). See generally Wilson, The Dormant Judgment in Texas, 2 BAYLOR L. REv. 421 (1950).
41. 223 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, writ ref'd). The court noted article 3773 was amended by the legislature with the intent the unnecessary methods of revival
in article 5532 would be avoided. Id. at 85.
42. See id. at 85. The Texas Supreme Court approved this proposition in Sanders v.
Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 595, 227 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1950).

43. 1 H.

WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

§ 2 (4th ed. 1916).

44. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 34849 (1944); Executive Jet Aviation v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 1974); Taliaferro y. Dykstra, 388 F. Supp. 957, 960 (E.D. Va. 1975). See generally Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
45. See Kaczmarek v. New Jersy Turnpike Auth., 390 A.2d 597, 602 (N.J. 1978); See
generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 118586 (1950).
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brought.4 6 Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to imply or read into
statutes of limitation exceptions not provided for in the adopted language. 4 7 The philosophy that legislative reform is the proper recourse
from injustices arising from applications of these statutes has prevailed.' 8
Nevertheless, a limited number of exceptions, including fraud4 9 and discovery,50 are recognized by many courts as having a tolling effect on
limitations.
The analogous doctrines of undiscovered fraud and fraudulent concealment have consistently provided sources of relief from an inequitable bar
by limitations." The undiscovered fraud rule provides that a statute of
limitations does not begin to run against an action for fraud until the
fraud is discovered or could have been discovered by the exercise of due
diligence." The fraudulent concealment doctrine, although derived from
the doctrine of undiscovered fraud, is broader since it is not limited to
actions based on fraud alone5" but may be applied in any type of claim.
Assertion of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment requires a showing of
due diligence, 54 lack of knowledge by the aggrieved party,55 and conceal-

46. See 30 Sw. L.J. 950, 951 (1976).
47. State v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 399 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. State, 380 S.W.2d 123, 127-28
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd); Continental Supply Co. v. Hutchings, 267
S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, writ ref'd).
48. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 321
(1965); Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 425-27 (1965).
49. L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 566 F.2d 494, 496 (5th Cir.
1978); Quinn v. Press, 135 Tex. 60, 64, 140 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1940); Pace v. McEwen, 574
S.W.2d 792, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. McClung v. Lawrence, 430 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1968); Gaddis v. Smith, 417
S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1967); Snellings v. Snellings, 482 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1972, writ refid n.r.e.).
51. See, e.g., Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 "(7th Cir. 1969); Department of Water
& Power v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 213 F. Supp. 341, 346 (S.D. Cal, 1963); Daves v. Lawyers Sur. Corp., 459 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
generally Comment, Intent to Conceal: Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations Under
the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEo. L.J. 791 (1976).
52. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Exploration Co. v.
United States, 247 U.S. 435, 449 (1918); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 622 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Austin Lake Estates, Inc. v. Meyer, 557 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, no writ). This rule has been applied to physicians when their negligence was not apparent until after limitations had run. See Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Tex.
1974).
53. See generally Comment, Intent to Conceal: Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitatons Under the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEo. L.J. 791, 794-95 (1976).
54. See, e.g., Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1974); Mittendorf v. J.R.
Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830-32 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Crown Coat Front Co. v.
United States, 275 F. Supp. 10, 16 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), affd, 395 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 853 (1968).
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ment by the defendant of the cause of action." The undiscovered fraud
rule was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bailey v.
Glover, 7 when the Court disapproved the use of limitations as a bar to
legitimate claims.58 Both doctrines offer a means of averting an unfair bar
by limitations when the underlying cause of action has been fraudulently
disguised." It would subvert the intent of limitations statutes to permit a
party who has fraudulently concealed60a cause of action to thereafter gain
protection by the statutes' existence.
Texas courts have long acknowledged the tolling effect of fraud on statutes of limitation.6 The general trend of the decisions supports the rule
that when simple fraud or fraudulent concealment is employed to prevent
a complainant from gaining knowledge of an underlying cause of action,
limitations will not start running until the fraud is discovered or might be
discovered by reasonable diligence.62 This precept has been given a strict

55. See, e.g., Atwell v. Retail Credit Co., 431 F.2d 1008, 1012 (4th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 420 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); Mansour v. Reeves Bldgs., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 482, 484 (S.D. W.
Va. 1973), aff'd per curium, 504 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1974).
56. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1974); City
of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 461 (2d Cir. 1974); Glazer Steel Corp. v.
Toyomenka, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 500, 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
57. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874) (defrauding party secretly transferred assets to
third party and then declared bankruptcy to avoid payment of debt owed claimant).
58. Id. at 349.
59. See Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1978); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573
F.2d 685, 694-95 (1st Cir. 1978). See generally Comment, Intent to Conceal: Tolling the
Antitrust Statute of Limitations Under the Fradulent Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEo. L.J.
791 (1976).
60. See NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1979); Alabama Bancorporation v. Henley, 465 F. Supp. 648, 652 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
61. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Marlowe, 553 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.- Tyler 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Soliz, 288 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Steele v. Glenn, 57 S.W.2d 908, 910-11 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland), dism'd per curiam, 141 Tex. 565, 61 S.W.2d 810 (1933). A cause accrues to
a party when suit may be brought on the wrong that created the right of action. Fraud tolls
limitations because the defendant is estopped from asserting limitations as a defense, even
though accrual of the cause relates back to the commission of the fraud. See Mandola v.
Mariotti, 557 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Tarkington v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 516 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. See, e.g., Citizen's State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ellison v. McGlaun, 482 S.W.2d 304, 311-12 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Republic Supply Co., v. French Oil Co., 392 S.W.2d
462, 464-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, no writ). Some cases hold fraud alone will not
suffice, but rather affirmative concealment of the fraud must have occurred to toll limitations. See Morris v. Texas Elks Crippled Children's Hosp., Inc., 525 S.W.2d 874, 882-83
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shipp v. O'Dowd, 454 S.W.2d 845, 847
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construction by Texas courts in keeping with the concept that exceptions
to statutes of limitations are recognized only sparingly when not mandated by the legislature.6s It has been applied in a variety of suits ranging
from actions for the cancellation of instruments"' to requests for relief
from the sale of realty. 5 As exemplified by the exceptions for fraud and
fraudulent concealment, equity is the basis upon which Texas courts generally justify the tolling of limitations." The defrauding party, due to his
reprehensible actions, should not have access to the statutorily created
defense of a limitations bar.67
Closely akin to the fraud-based theories previously discussed is the discovery rule, which is a relatively new adoption by Texas courts.6 The rule
stipulates statutory limitations do not begin to run until the plaintiff
learns, or by exercising reasonable diligence should have learned, of the
injury from which his right of action accrues.
70

9

Since its initial pro-

nouncement in Hahn v. Claybrook' the discovery rule has been most
frequently associated with medical malpractice cases.7 1 In these situa(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. See L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 566 F.2d 494, 496 (5th
Cir. 1978); McFaddin, Wiess, & Kyle Land Co. v. Texas Rice Land Co., 253 S.W. 916, 919
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923), aff'd, 265 S.W. 888 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt
adopted).
64. See, e.g., McMullen Oil & Royalty Co. v. Lyssy, 353 S.W.2d 311, 314-15 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1962, no writ) (suit to cancel mineral deeds barred by limitations when grantor could have discovered grantee's fraud through exercise of due diligence); Hooks v.
Brown, 348 S.W.2d 104, 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit to cancel
bill of sale due to fraud not barred by four year statute); Rumfield v. Rumfield, 324 S.W.2d
304, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fraudulent representation tolled
limitations in action to cancel will).
65. See Stephenson v. O'Neal, 433 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fleming v. Todd, 42 S.W.2d 123, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.- Beaumont 1931, writ dism'd).
66. See, e.g., Wise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 612, 359 S.W.2d 876, 880 (1962);
Blondeau v. Sommer, 139 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, writ refd);
American Indem. Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1937,
writ ref'd).
67. See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L.
REV. 1177, 1217-19 (1950).
68. See, e.g., Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. 1976) (credit libel); Gaddis v.
Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. 1967) (medical malpractice); Atkins v. Crosland, 417
S.W.2d 150, 153-54 (Tex. 1967) (accounting negligence).
69. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. 1967) (cause of action does not accrue, therefore limitations do not run until discovery of the harm).
70. 100 A. 83 (Md. 1917) (excessive doses of prescribed drug produced skin discoloration; however, no relief as complainant could have discovered injury within statutory
period).
71. See, e.g., Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (Idaho 1964); Waldman v.
Rohrbaugh, 215 A.2d 825, 828-29 (Md. 1966); Johnson v. Caldwell, 123 N.W.2d 785, 791
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tions, the rule provides that a cause of action against the physician accrues only when the patient discovers, or through reasonable care should
have discovered, the negligent act. 72 The doctrine is gaining increased acceptance and has been codified by several states.72 In the 1967 case of
Gaddis v. Smith,74 the Texas Supreme Court sanctioned use of the discovery rule in professional malpractice cases. 7 The court in Gaddis reasoned the contrary rule, which barred the claimant from recovery, would
circumvent the policy reasons supporting the statute of limitations and
perpetuate an unconscionable injustice on the plaintiff.76 It was noted
that under certain conditions it is nearly impossible for a victim to discover he has been the object of an intentional or negligent wrong.77 The

court reasoned the discovery rule embodies an equitable approach obviating the harsh results of traditional applications of statutes of limitation.7 8
In Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts7' the Texas Supreme Court
considered whether fraud would preserve a judgment by tolling the pertinent limitations period. 0 The court initially held any wrongful interference with property encumbered by a judgment lien will stand as the basis
for an action of conspiracy 1 when such interference serves to prevent collection of the lien.' 2 The court determined that a debtor's fraudulent con-

(Mich. 1963).
72. See Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. 1967). See generally Comment,
Discovery Rule: Accrual of Cause of Action For Medical Malpractice, 25 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 78 (1968).
73. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1977) (actions must be brought within six months after
discovery or time negligence should have been discovered but in no event may an action be
brought more than four years after commission of negligent act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-584 (West Supp. 1979) (limit of three years after negligent act allowed for party to
bring action); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (general adoption of discovery
principles).
74. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (physician negligently left surgical sponge inside claimant's body after performing a caesarean section).
75. See id. at 581. The discovery rule was also applied in 1967 to a suit based on the
negligence of an accountant. See Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153-54 (Tex. 1967).
76. See Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. 1967).
77. See id. at 581. See also McFarland v. Connally, 252 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1952, no writ).
78. See Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. 1967).
79. 591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
80. See id. at 807.
81. See id. at 808. To maintain an action for conspiracy a claimant must demonstrate
that defendents "have been guilty of the commission of a wrongful act in violation of some
right of the complainants, and that damage has resulted as a proximate consequence of the
wrongful act complained of." Id. at 807-08. See also Annot., 2 A.L.R. 287 (1919).
82. See Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1979). In
this instance the property forming the basis of the claimant's suit was located in Louisiana.
Stonecipher's judgment, however, was only abstracted in Orange County, Texas; so, it was
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cealment of assets will toll limitations governing the validity of a judg-

ment lien until the creditor discovers he had been defrauded, so long as
reasonable diligence has been exercised to discover the fraud."8 In reaching this conclusion the court noted that a number of prior decisions have
reached the same conclusion, but denied relief because the creditor failed
to show sufficient diligence to discover the debtor's assets.84 Reaffirming
the court's traditional abhorrence of fraud,83 Justice Campbell reasoned
that although Texas has statutory provisions that contain measures enabling one to extend the life of judgments, these methods are not exclusive. 6 In limited instances, the court may apply exceptions to statutes of
limitations, especially in a case in which fraud has prevented one from
asserting his rights.8 7 The court declared the Butts' actions in fraudulently conveying their property to Newman suspended limitations until
such time as Stonecipher might-reasonably acquire notice of his right to
execute on the lien.88 The resultant decision by the court served to contravene the prevailing rule as expressed by the lower court and grant the
judgment creditor a measure of relief.89
The decision enunciated by the Stonecipher court parallels the rationale of cases in which the discovery rule has been applied.' 0 Gaddis v.
Smith,91 the leading Texas case wherein discovery principles were invoked to redress a medical malpractice claim, may be favorably compared
with Stonecipher. The Texas Supreme Court declared in Gaddis that a
cause of action for a physician's negligence does not accrue until the pa-

effective only as to realty in that county. Therefore, the Louisiana land owned by the debtor
was not within the scope of Stonecipher's lien, and an action for conspiracy would fail. For
these reasons, the case was not decided on this point. Id. at 808.
83. Id. at 809.
84. Id. at 808; see Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1879) (no showing of diligence by claimant); Dole v. Wilson, 40 N.W. 161, 162 (Minn. 1888) (plaintiff's neglect will
preclude extending statutory limitations).
85. Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979). The
court followed Morris v. House, 32 Tex. 492 (1870), stating "that fraud vitiates whatever it
touches." Id. at 809.
86. Id. at 809.
87. See id. at 809.
88. See id. at 810.
89. See id. at 810.
90. See, e.g., Wise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 611, 359 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1962) (fraud);
Atlas Chem. Indus. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974)
(action for property damage), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975); Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d
613, 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit for reformation
of a deed). See generally Harper, Texas Adopts the Discovery Rule for Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77 (1969).
91. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
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tient might reasonably discover the resulting harm.'3 In essence, the decision in Stonecipher mirrors the policy reasons underlying the approach
adopted in Gaddis.' In both instances, the court recognized limitation
statutes are generally designed to bar stale and fraudulent claims, and by
its ultimate decision intimated that neither case is particularly susceptible to contrived prosecutions. 4 Moreover, any hardship imposed on the
defendant is counter-balanced by the inequitable results of a contrary
rule denying the plaintiff, innocent of any intentional or negligent delay,
the right to assert his claim." Absent judicial relief, the aggrieved party is
without a remedy because of the negligence of a physician in performing
surgery or the fraudulent concealment of assets by a debtor." In either
case, it would represent a grave injustice to concur in the defendant's assertion that the claimant has been "sitting on his rights' 7 in dereliction
of his duty to bring suit promptly, 9s especially considering the claimant
was unaware of such rights until limitations had expired. 9
The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Stonecipher may be viewed as
indicative of a course adopted to accomplish needed changes the state's
legislature has been slow in providing. 1°0 As a rule, courts are reluctant to

92. See id. at 580.
93. Compare id. at 581 (limitations commence only when plaintiff knows or has reason
to know of foreign object negligently left in body) with Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of
Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979) (fraudulent concealment by judgment debtor tolls
limitations).
94. See Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. 1967). In Fernandi v. Strully the court stated, "It
must be born in mind that Mrs. Fernandi's claim does not raise questions as to her credibility. . . . Here the lapse of time does not entail the danger of a false or frivolous claim
.
Fernandi
.
v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277, 286 (N.J. 1961).
95. Cf. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. 1967) (often impossible to discover
physician's negligence within statutory period).
96. See Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 147-48, 157 S.W.2d 878, 878-79 (1942); Stewart
v. Janes, 393 S.W.2d 428, 428-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd). Since statutory
relief is inadequate, courts have resorted to a number of transparent remedies of their own
design. See Morrison v. Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Ariz. 1948) (statute is tolled when
doctor has probable knowledge of negligence but remains silent); Schmit v. Esser, 236 N.W.
622, 624-25 (Minn. 1931) (limitations do not commence until physician/patient relationship
concludes).
97. See Comment, Discovery Rule: Accrual of Cause of Action For Medical Malpractice, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 78, 83 (1968).
98. See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
99. See Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 999-1000 (Or. 1966); Morgan v. Grace Hosp.,
Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156, 161-62 (W. Va. 1965).
100. See Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979);
Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. 1967) (discovery rule adopted as exception to
applicable limitations statute as legislature has not enacted such an exception).
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engraft exceptions upon limitation statutes however reasonable and equitable such variances may seem. 01 It has generally been held that existent
statutes applicable to the revival of judgments contain complete and comprehensive means for perpetuating the force of such judgments. 0 2 The
consequences of this policy were brought to bear on a sizeable number of
meritorious claims arising from a debtor's fraud, which were barred in
accordance with this strict statutory construction.103 As previously noted,
when the gist of an action is fraud, or fraudulent concealment, many
courts have seen fit to imply an exception to the applicable limitations
period.1 0 4 Prior to Stonecipher, however, Texas courts had not employed
this practice in aid of a judgment creditor whose lien had expired due to
the debtor's concealment of realty which properly should have been the
subject of execution.'0 " The court in Stonecipher determined the most
equitable means of avoiding injustice in that instance required judicial
legislation,106 an available, although seldom used, means for avoiding a
rigid limitations statute.1 0 7 As solidly established in every jurisdiction as
are statutes of limitation,10 8 it is no wonder they are often overlooked as
subjects of legislative reform; even less surprising is that most changes, as
in the instant case, have been effectuated through the judicial system.'0 9
The Stonecipher pronouncement will undoubtedly impact significantly
on litigation involving judgment liens in Texas. Creditors who have been
victimized by fraudulent actions of their debtors are now afforded a much
101. See State v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 399 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. State, 380 S.W.2d
123, 127-28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd); Continental Supply Co. v. Hutchings, 267 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, writ ref'd).
102. See Thomas v. Murray, 49 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Okla. 1935) (no exceptions to pertinent statutes allowed); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 93, 138 S.W.2d 531,
536 (1940) (relevant statutes should be strictly construed); Tax. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
3773 (Vernon 1966) & art. 5532 (Vernon 1958).
103. See Thomas v. Murray, 49 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Okla. 1935); General Am. Life Ins. Co.
v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 93-94, 138 S.W.2d 531, 536 (1933); Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of
Butts, 579 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 591 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1979).
104. See Ramos v. Levingston, 536 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, no writ); Featherlax Corp. v. Chandler, 412 S.W.2d 783, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1966, writ refd n.r.e.); Polk Terrace, Inc. v. Harper, 386 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1979).
106. Id. at 809.
107. Cf. McNeill v. Simpson, 39 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgmt
adopted) (court avoids limitations bar by implying agreement between parties); Fidelity
Union Cas. Co. v. Texas Power & Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1931, writ ref d) (limitations suspended in tort action while compensation claim was
litigated).
108. See 30 Sw. L.J. 950, 957 (1976).
109. See id. at 957.
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needed remedy."' The possibility exists, however, that a considerable
number of legitimate, and not so legitimate, defrauded creditors will seek
to litigate claims previously thought to be barred. Therefore, a clearer
delineation of the Stonecipher decision should be considered by the
state's lawmakers. In certain instances courts have been forced to devise
various transparent exceptions to limitation statutes in order to do justice."' To avoid such a predicament, the legislature should enact an
amendment to article 5532112 detailing an exception to limitations in
cases of fraud. Through adoption of a variation of the discovery rule,
modified to fit these circumstances and with restrictions plainly described, unwarranted and ill-advised interpretations of the statute may be
avoided. The effect of a suit by a bona fide creditor after stated limitations have lapsed would be comparable to a bill of review proceeding after
a default judgment." 3 No time limit on bringing such an action would be
expressly set forth, but it would lie within the court's discretion to bar a
claim when conditions required as much."' For his burden of proof, the
claimant should be required to demonstrate that extrinsic fraud'" of a
specified nature prevented the assertion of his claim and that his own
negligence or lack of diligence in no way contributed to his belated discovery of the preexisting fraud."1 Although many meritorius claims will
assuredly benefit from the Stonecipher decision, an indiscriminant appli110. Cf. Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972) (in a vasectomy case, discovery
rule provides most effective relief for injured party when impossible to discover negligence
within statutory time period).
111..See, e.g., Sellers v. Noah, 95 So. 167, 167-68 (Ala. 1923) (plaintiff treats malpractice action as one based on contract in order to use longer limitations period); Huysman v.
Kirsch, 57 P.2d 908, 912 (Cal. 1936) (when foreign object is left in patient's body, doctor's
"continuing negligence" tolls statute until object is discovered); Lakeman v. La France, 156
A.2d 123, 126 (N.H. 1959) (fraudulent concealment of cause of action by physician prevents
limitations from running).
112. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958).
113. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b. The bill of review is an equitable proceeding used when
a party's legal remedy is inadequate. Often it provides the only relief available to a
defendent when another's fraud has prevented him from asserting his rights. See, e.g.,
Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Tex. 1964); Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565,
569, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (Tex. 1950); Lyons v. Paul, 321 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. See Johnson v. Potter, 384 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ)
(bill of review failed due to lack of diligence by appellant to set aside prior judgment);
American Spiritualist Ass'n v. Dallas, 366 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no
writ) (no evidence introduced by proponent to support allegations). Extrinsic fraud is a
wrong committed "by the other party to the suit which has prevented the losing party...
from knowing about his rights .
Crouch v. Panama Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 633, 639, 138
S.W.2d 94, 97 (1940).
115. Id. at 638, 138 S.W.2d at 97.
116. See Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. 1968).
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cation of the exception would be inappropriate and unwise. " The statutes relating to judgment liens provide an easily understood and convenient means of preserving those liens. Courts, prior to granting relief,
should strive to ensure creditors have not been negligent in failing to
avail themselves of the available methods of lien extension. Although due
diligence is a question of fact,118 a strict interpretation of that requirement should alleviate somewhat the potential for abuse of the
Stonecipher exception to the statute of limitations. In addition, courts
ought not forget there must eventually be a point at which all claims are
barred." Therefore, the merits of each case must necessarily weigh heavily in the ultimate verdict.
Although the court's finding in Stonecipher is one of first impression in
Texas, 2 0 it is sustained by settled axioms derived from analogous areas of
the law. It recognizes the deficiencies of those statutes that govern the
validity of judgment liens 21 and resolves the concealment of assets question in a most equitable fashion. 2 ' Through prudent administration of
the precepts enunciated by the majority, or preferably by an amendment
to the current statute, the courts of Texas now have the opportunity to
apply justice equitably to defrauded judgment creditors.
J. Randall Grimes

117. See 46 TEXAS L. REv. 119, 123 (1967). The discovery rule should have been employed "whenever this approach would not subvert the statutory purpose of preventing stale
and fraudulent claims." Id.
118. E.g., Ruebeck v. Hunt, 142 Tex. 167, 171, 176 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1943); Hines v.
Wilson, 197 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ray v. Barrington, 297 S.W. 781, 785-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, no writ).
119. See Owen v. White, 380 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1967) (medical malpractice action
for mistaken diagnosis and treatment barred by two year statute); Pico v. Cohn, 25 P. 970,
971 (Cal. 1891). "Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be
worse than occasional miscarriages of justice." Pico v. Cohn, 25 P. 970, 971 (Cal. 1891). See

also 1 H.

WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

§ 2 (4th ed. 1916).

120. Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979).
121. See Tzx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (Vernon 1966) & art. 5532 (Vernon 1958).
122. See Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979).
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